VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now he says that it is not only the nine obstacles, but that pain, &c., too appearing as their companions, act similarly:—'Pain, &c.'

Pain is that which is cognized as being contrary to the mind for the time. It is from one's self, when it is either bodily such as caused by disease, or, mental, such as caused by desire, &c. It is from external causes when it is caused by a tiger, &c. It comes from the powers of nature when it is caused by such things as the planetary influences. All this pain is cognized by every living creature as contrary to one's being. It is, therefore, to be removed. This is what he says:—'Affected by which, &c.' When physical life drinks in, *i.e.*, takes in external air contrary to one's wish, the act of in-breathing becomes contrary to the branch of Yoga known as the Rechaka, the conscious out-breathing). When physical life expels the internal air against wish, the act of out-breathing is contrary to the branch of Yoga known as Pûraka, the (conscious in-breathing).—3.

Sûtra 32.

तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः ॥ ३२ ॥

तत् Tat, their. प्रतिषेध Pratiṣedha, preventions. अर्थम् Artham, for. एक Eka, of one. तत्त्व Tattva, truth or subject. अभ्यास: Abhyâsaḥ, habituation.

32. For their prevention, habituation to one Truth.

अथैते विक्षेपाः समाधिप्रतिपक्षास्ताभ्यामेवाभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां निरोद्धव्याः। तत्राभ्यासस्य विषयमुपसंहरन्निदमाह। तत्प्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वाभ्यासः। विक्षेपप्रतिषेधार्थमेकतत्त्वावलम्बनं चित्तमभ्यसेत्। यस्य तु प्रत्यर्थनियतं प्रत्ययमात्रं क्षणिकं च चित्तं तस्य सर्वमेव चित्तमेकाग्रं नास्त्येव विक्षिप्तम्। यदि पुनरिदं सर्वतः प्रत्याहृत्यैकस्मिन्नर्थे समाधीयते तदा भवत्येकाग्रमित्यतो न प्रत्यर्थनियतम्। योऽपि सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाहेन चित्तमेकाग्रं मन्यते तस्यैकाग्रता यदि प्रवाहचित्तस्य धर्मस्तदैकं नास्ति प्रवाहचित्तं क्षणिकत्वात्। अथ प्रवाहांशस्यैव प्रत्ययस्य धर्मः स सर्वः सदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही वा विसदृशप्रत्ययप्रवाही वा प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वादेकाग्र एवेति विक्षिप्तचित्तानुपपत्तिः। तस्मादेकमनेकार्थमवस्थितं चित्तमिति। यदि च चित्तनैकेनान्विताः स्वभावभिन्नाः प्रत्यया जायेरन्नथ कथमन्यप्रत्ययदृष्टस्यान्यः स्मर्ता भवेत्। अन्यप्रत्ययोपचितस्य च कर्माशयस्यान्यः प्रत्युपभोक्ता भवेत्। कथंचित्समाधीयमानमप्येतदगोमयपायसीयन्यायमाक्षिपति। किं च स्वात्मानुभवापह्नवश्चित्तस्यान्यत्वे प्राप्नोति। कथं यदहमद्राक्षं तत्स्पृशामि यच्चास्प्राक्षं तत्पश्याम्यहमितिप्रत्ययः सर्वस्य प्रत्ययस्य भेदे सति प्रत्ययिन्यभेदेनोपस्थितः। एक प्रत्ययिविषयोपमभेदात्मा अहमिति प्रत्ययः। कथमत्यन्तभिन्नेषु चित्तेषु वर्तमानं सामान्यमेकं प्रत्ययिनमाश्रयेत्। स्वानुभवग्राह्यश्चायमभेदात्मा अहमितिप्रत्ययः। न च प्रत्यक्षस्य माहात्म्यं प्रमाणान्तरेणाभिभूयते। प्रमाणान्तरं च प्रत्यक्षबलेनैव व्यवहारं लभते तस्मादेकमनेकार्थमवस्थितं च चित्तम् ॥ ३२ ॥

VYÂSA.

Now these distractions, the antagonists of trance, are to be checked by the same practice and desirelessness. It is to finish the subject of practice that he says:—'For the prevention thereof, habituation to ONE

TRUTH.' For the prevention of distractions, let the mind take to ONE TRUTH and make itself habitually familiar with it.

To him who believes in a mind separate and distinct for every cognized object, in fact a bundle of notions only, and but momentary (in existence) all minds are one-pointed (ekâgra) only. There is no distracted mind.

If, however, the mind is concentrated on one object, only when, having been drawn away from all other objects, it turns away to one object, then it is not separate and distinct for every cognized object.

He who believes the mind to be one-pointed if it flows along similar notions, might opine that one-pointedness is a characteristic of the flowing mind. If so, then the flowing would not be one, because it is said to be momentary.

If, however, it is the characteristic of a notion which is only a portion of the entire stream (of flowing mental phenomena), then it is always one-pointed, whether it flows along similar or dissimilar notions; because in this case it is separate and distinct for every object. Thus we would fall upon the non-existence of a distracted mind. Hence the mind is one, has many objects, and is not momentary, but stable.

Further, if it be thought that the notions are born, each separate from the other in nature, and are not linked (by the common basis of) one single mind, then how would any one mind remember a notion cognized by another. And how would any one enjoy the vehicle of action brought into being by the notions of another?

Howsoever the matter is examined, it illustrates the story of the milk and the cowdung. Separate mind for every cognized object leads to destruction of self i.e. I

Further, if the mind be separate and distinct for every cognized object, then the notion of the identity of the self is destroyed. How can such notions as, 'I touch what I saw,' and 'I see what I touched previously,' point to a common knower, when all the notions are separate and distinct? no common knower when there is separate mind for same object perceived for a time being

The feeling of 'I am' is always identical does not change

The notion of the 'I am' is always identical with itself and points out to but one cogniser. But there can be no single cognizer as a common basis, if it manifest itself in entirely distinct minds every moment. The notion of 'I am' as one undifferentiated continuous self is cognized by internal perception; and the authority of perception is not to be defeated by any other means of knowledge. Other means of knowledge work only by the power of perception. Hence the mind is one and has many objects and it changes not every moment.—32.

VÂCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Introduces the aphorism which finishes the subject under discussion :—'Now these distractions, &c.'

Now it is on account of the context that this aphorism is spoken of as finishing only half the subject under discussion. These distractions are spoken of as antagonists of the trance to explain the object with which they are to be checked.

Although in the aphorism, 'By feeling the omnipresence of the Lord' the process of mental habituation only is described, yet desirelessness also is to be understood, because it is a help to habituation. With this in mind, he says :—'They are to be checked by the same practice *and desirelessness*.'

'This is said to finish the subject of practice':—This sentence is spoken because the subject of practice immediately precedes. The ONE TRUTH is God, because that is the context.

To the Vainâṣikas all minds are one-pointed only; there is no distracted mind. Hence their teachings and the acts they inculcate, are all useless. With this object he says :—"To him who believes, &c." The theory is that the mind is separate and distinct for every object whether it to be a single one in itself, or one out of many. It remains in being only so long as the object shines in consciousness and then disappears at once, not going to another object.

Why does not the mind take in another object after having taken in one before that? Because it is said to be momentary. This means that existence before and after, cannot be posited of a mind, which cannot be spoken of as remaining the same in more than one successive moment of time.

According to our teaching the mind is not momentary in existence, and remains constant, whether the objects of thought be one or manifold. It is not confined to one single object seeing that it takes in and gives up objects every moment and can so far be called distracted, and also that it can cultivate one-pointedness when the modification of distractedness has been removed. This teaching and the acts recommended on its strength are not useless. With this object, he says :—'And if it becomes concentrated, &c.' Concludes :—'Thus it is not distinct and separate for every object.'

Again he introduces the Vainâṣika :—'He who believes the mind to be one-pointed if it flows along similar notions, &c.' His meaning is stated to be as follows :—'Let it be granted that the cultivation of one-pointedness is not possible in a mind confined to one moment only and that therefore it is useless to put forth effort with that object. The continuous succession of minds, however, is unending and not momentary in its nature; it is possible in the succession that distraction may be removed and one-pointedness cultivated.'

He shows the defects of the theory in the case of either of the two statements thereof. If in the philosophy of the Vainâṣhika one-pointedness is a characteristic of the flowing mind, *i.e.*, of the un-ending succession of minds, then, there being successive mental births for succeeding mental impressions, there does not exist one flowing mind common to all the successive impressions. But why should it not be so? Because in your philosophy, whatever exists for as long a time as it may be, must be momentary; there is nothing that is not momentary.

Takes the other form of the theory :—'If however it is, &c.' If in the successive flow of mental phenomena a notion having the Highest Good appears at a single point, one-pointedness with reference to this particular notion may be secured by effort.

Shows the defects of this theory. The whole of this succesive flow of mental phenomena may be a flow of either similar or dissimilar notions. It is, therefore, separate and distinct for every distinct object, and as such takes the form of the Highest Good simply

for the expression of it, and therefore it is destroyed on the disappearance of the mind. Such a mind is always one-pointed. There can, therefore, be no distracted mind. It cannot, therefore, be that one-pointedness may be cultivated by and after the removal of distractedness. Concludes :—'Hence the mind is, &c.'

Further says, that for another reason too the mind is one having many objects, and is constant not momentary :—'And if it be so, &c.' As the Teaching studied by Maitra is not remembered by Chaitra, and as the fruit of the vehicle of action grown by Maitra in not enjoyed by Chaitra, in the shape of virtue and vice, inasmuch as Chaitra is not related to it, so one notion cannot remember the object of another notion; nor can one notion enjoy the fruit of the vehicle of action grown by another notion.

But, says the questioner, this line of reasoning will not be violated, if the relation of cause and effect exists; and it is on account of the existence of that differentia, that in the *Śrâdha* and *Vaiśvânara* sacrifice, &c., the fruit is seen reaching father, mother, and son, who are not the performers thereof; and also because the sweetness of the mango, seeds, &c., always appears in due course in the fruits thereof.

For this reason, says :—'However is the matter examined, &c.' This is the meaning. What is the difference between notions falling into one succession and those falling into another, so that a notion falling into one succession may remember and enjoy the notions, experience and the vehicle of action grown by the notions of the same succession but not by the notions of another succession? Succession is not an independently existing substance, so that one succession may be differentiated from another succession. And it is not proper that a fanciful differentia may be fastened upon an action. No one can cook if he only fancies the existence of fire anywhere. Further, the relation of cause and effect also is not real. In the case of simultaneous existence there can be no such relation, as for example, between the right and left horns. In the case of objects which do not exist simultaneously, no relation of cause and effect necessarily exists; because it may be that none of them can be predicated of a phenomenon appearing in the immediate present. The past and the future cannot exist together as being related to a phenomenon appearing independently in the present. Therefore, being independent real objects as they are, they do not differ from each other whether they fall in their own or in independent successions. The reason is that they do not come into contact with each other, not being related to each other by either natural causation or by succession. This logic is like that of the milk and cow-dung cakes.

"All that is produced from the cow is milk.
Cow-dung cakes are produced from the cow.
Therefore cow-dung cakes are milk."

This illustrates the story, which means that it surpasses in fallacy even the logic of the milk and the cow-dung.

Furthermore, the destruction of that which has been done, and the appearance of that which has not been done, should not be mentioned here as an argument. Because the mind alone is the doer of actions, and the mind alone is associated with the pleasures and pains born out of them. It is because the mind enjoys pleasure and pain on account of the presence therein of the reflection of consciousness, and because the consciousness and the mind in which it is present are taken to be one, that they are attributed to the Puruṣa. The notions born in the mind, when the notion of its being the self has already come in there, are of such a nature that they alone remember and enjoy their own fruits, not others. And it is not reasonable to say that the nature of a thing may be separated from it, and then joined to it again. It cannot be said of the nature of a thing that it might or might not be so, or why is it not so?

He speaks to those who are satisfied with the above :—'Further, if the mind be separate and distinct for every object, &c., mental impressions and their memories have the characteristics of manifestation and latency. They are many and yet the mind in which they live, *i.e.*, the notion of the 'I am,' is one and not different for each. This one notion of the 'I am' unites all those separate notions into one. How can this *one* hold all the extremely different notions into itself? Inasmuch as there is difference in the causes of the phenomena of cognition and memory and also on account of the presence in them of the contradictory qualities of manifestation and latency, there can be no single notion of reflex condition by virtue of which the mind, in which all the different and contradictory notions are generated, may be considered to be a single entity.

For this reason, he says :—'It is cognised by internal perception.'

But it may be said that the difference of causes and the possession of contradictory qualities refute the truth of this perception. In answer to this objection, he says :—'and the authority of perception, &c.'

It is on the basis of perception alone that the unity of material and the contradictory nature of the characteristics of latency and manifestation have been established in the Nyâyakanikâ ; and the action of objections in a permanent mind is established in the Nyâyakanikâ and the Brahmatattva-samîkṣâ. Thus all is plain.—32.

Sûtra 33.

मैत्रीकरुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् ॥ ३३ ॥

मैत्री Maitrî, friendliness. करुणा Karuṇâ, compassion, mercy. मुदिता Muditâ, gladness, complacency. उपेक्षा Upekṣâ, indifference of all these. सुख Sukha, happiness. दुःख Duḥkha, misery. पुण्य: Puṇya, virtue. अपुण्य Apuṇya, vice. विषयाणाम् Viṣayâṇâm, regarding the subjects, towards the subjects (respectively). भावनात: Bhâvanâtaḥ, by cultivating habits, by constant thinking. चित्त Chitta, of the mind. प्रसादनम् Prasâdanam, purification.

33. By cultivating habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice (respectively) the mind becomes pure.

यस्य चित्तस्यावस्थितस्येदं शास्त्रेण परिकर्म निर्दिश्यते तत्कथम् । मैत्री करुणामुदितोपेक्षाणां सुखदुःखपुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् । तत्र सर्वप्राणिषु सुखसंभोगापन्नेषु मैत्रीं भावयेत् । दुःखितेषु करुणाम् । पुण्यात्मकेषु मुदिताम् । अपुण्यशीलेषूपेक्षाम् । एवमस्य भावयतः शुक्लो धर्म उपजायते । ततश्च चित्तं प्रसीदति । प्रसन्नमेकाग्रं स्थितिपदं लभते ॥ ३३ ॥

VYÂSA.

How is the embellishment of the permanent mind taught by this science, secured? 'The mind becomes pure by cultivating habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice.' Let him cultivate in his mind the habit of friendliness towards all those who are found in the enjoyment of pleasure;